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On May 13, 2004, Canadian federal
government’s Minister of Industry,
the Honourable Lucienne Robillard,
released Principles for Electronic
Authentication: A Canadian
Framework (the ‘Principles’)1. The
Principles are the culmination of two
years work by a working group
consisting of representatives of
industry, government and consumer
groups. They continue Industry
Canada’s efforts to promote
electronic commerce by both the
promulgation of guidelines and
legislative initiatives, and by
participating in ongoing dialogues
at the international level. The
Principles are not legislation and do
not appear to foreshadow
legislative action. At present, the
federal government does not appear
to have a legislative agenda to
enforce uniform criteria for
authentication systems outside the
federal government.2
Authentications
Electronic commerce provides tremendous
opportunities and efficiencies in both the private
and public sectors. Confidence in such systems,
which by their nature do not involve face to face
interaction, is essential. Confidence is fragile,
however. Incidents whereby personal information
or funds are misdirected by fraudulent means or
error dramatically set back the progress of
electronic commerce. The Principles rightly identify
authentication of electronic transactions as making
a significant contribution to building user comfort
in electronic commerce.3
Authentication refers to any process by which
credentials of a person are confirmed to allow
access to a service or rights. We undergo
authentication processes all the time. Signature
confirmation at a bank is the archetypical form of
authentication. Presentation of a passport with a
quick confirmation of the passport photograph is
an authentication for obtaining access to
government-sanctioned travel privileges. In the
world of electronic commerce, proxies must be
found for these face to face interactions. The most
common electronic authentication process is the
use of user names and passwords. The more
sensitive the service, the more safeguards are
added to the mix. For example, financial services
web sites use encryption, additional back-up
passwords, scoring systems based on answers to
questions and call centre verification of identifying
information.
In addition to systems that confirm credentials
or the identity of the individual accessing the
system, authentication systems also include
measures to confirm the integrity of the received
message itself. Integrity of messages is
fundamental to ensuring that the credentials
presented are real and that the request remains as
originated by the person trying to obtain access to
the service or right. For example, for an e-mail
money transfer, it is certainly important to know
whether it really is the account holder making the
request, but it is also vitally important to know
that the funds are directed to the person the
account-holder intended.
At the present time, Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) is the technology of choice for authentication
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1 The Principles can be found at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/authen.
2 Interestingly, the release of the Principle coincides with circulation for comment of new regulations 
(http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partI/2004/20040508/html/regle6-e.html) relating to certification authorities under 
Part II of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (2000) (“PIPEDA”). Part II of PIPEDA was 
designed to provide for electronic alternatives to paper-based signatures where signatures are required under 
federal legislation. Failure to designate statutes to which Part II applies has left it inoperative, however. The 
regulation is more detailed than the Principles in that it sets out criteria for certification authorities for the purposes
of authentication recognition. It remains to be seen whether the federal government will designate existing federal 
legislation (e.g. The Bills of Exchange Act) so that electronic signatures are treated as equivalent to paper signatures 
for the purposes of executing documents required by such legislation.
3 Principles, p 2.
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systems. PKI relies on the interaction of two
“keys”, one public (that is, revealed by the owner)
and one private (not revealed by the owner).4 PKI
rests on a secure infrastructure and, critically, on
reliable certification authorities to administer and
confirm keys within that system. If an institution is
going to accept a transaction from an individual
through a system supported by PKI, it must have
confidence in the certification authority. This can
be achieved either by carrying out the function
within the umbrella of the institution itself or by
relying on certification authorities that meet its
criteria for reliability.
Currently, institutions running electronic systems
rely for the most part on their own assessments of
suitable authentication systems. There are no
universally accepted authentication systems cutting
across commercial and government sectors. Banks
authenticate transactions for their own customers
based on identifying information gathered by the
bank. The legal foundation of the relationship is
the traditional account agreement with the
customer. Government also has its own
authentication methodologies for tax filing and
other services. Each sector and each player within
sectors has its own risk tolerance and its own
distinct methodology.
This ‘silo’ approach to authentication has
disadvantages. Without widely accepted
approaches and standards for authentication, an
enterprise is hesitant to accept authentication from
another enterprise for its customers. Different risk
tolerances may exist between the organizations.
Agreements are difficult to reach without common
principles within which to frame the discussion.
The same issues exist on a broader scale at the
international level. Whether countries or trade
blocks are formulating legislative initiatives or
merely making recommendations for industry
implementation, common principles are an
important element of promoting international
trade through electronic means.5 For example, the
Canada-United Kingdom Joint Statement on
Global Electronic Commerce and E-Government
(the “Joint Statement”) declares the desire of both
countries to establish “a common framework and
approach that would promote electronic
transactions across borders and that support a
variety of authentication technologies.”6 The
acceptance of “made in Canada” authentication
systems internationally is one of the stated aims
behind the Principles.
The Industry Canada
Principles 
The Principles should be considered with this
broader background in mind. The Principles are
designed to be a framework and necessarily cover
a broad spectrum of relationships.7 Those who
expect to receive clear direction from the
government regarding design and technical
aspects of authentication systems will not find that
level of detail here. The working group appears to
have concluded that detailed prescriptions would
risk the exclusion of sector-specific concerns and
future obsolescence as technology develops.
Specific standards are better left to industry groups
and standards organizations.8
What also does not appear in the Principles is a
specific effort to promote interoperability between
authentication products, or fostering competition
in the certification-service-provider industry-goals,
for example, found in Directive 1999/93/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 1999 on a Community framework for
electronic signatures. Instead, the Principles are
focussed on the broad issues, which should be
addressed by companies developing agreements
intending to create authentication systems. The
Principles establish broad categories for continuing
discussion.
Even though the Principles specifically state that
they do not address consumer protection,9 concern
for the place of end users in the establishment of
any system is a theme throughout. A number of
the Principles acknowledge the importance of
protecting the rights of end-users through
information sharing, the protection of privacy and
the handling of complaints. These concerns are in
keeping with international initiatives like the OECD
Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context
of Electronic Commerce, and are the corollary of
the working group’s stated belief that robust
authentication processes should enhance user
confidence.
Each Principle consists of a core statement
followed by explanatory text. The discussion
remains high level however, suggesting a
consistent intention to suggest rather than
legislate for solutions.
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5 The Principles refer to the importance of OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks (p 24) 
and state that the Principles have been drafted to be compatible with international developments in authentication.
6 Joint Statement, p 4. The Joint Statement was signed by then Minister of Industry Brian Tobin and then President of 
the Treasury Board and Minster responsible for Infrastructure the Honourable Lucienne Robillard on February 20, 
2001.
7 Principles, p 9.
8 The Internet Engineering Task Force’s Public Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group, for instance, was 
established with the intent to develop the Internet standards needed to support an X.509-based PKI.
9 Principles, p 5.
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Principle 1 is a useful discussion of roles and
responsibilities within authentication systems. The
principle will assist those who are developing risk
analyses or system-related agreements to identify
and discuss the various roles and proper risk
allocation. The desire to foster development of
broadly based authentication systems (not
restricted to one industry or sector) is clear. The
commentary to Principle 1 states that
authentication administrators must choose
attributes for authentication so that “other
participants may have credibility in the claimed
attributes.”10 Similarly the Principle encourages
Standards Developers to encourage uniformity in
authentication implementation.
Principle 2 deals with risk assessment and
management and is familiar ground for legal
counsel who advises clients with respect to
information technology systems. Authentication
systems are by their nature complex. Risk
assessment is compounded by the multiple parties
who deal with various (relatively complex)
responsibilities. As the commentary states, the
functional roles identified under Principle 1 are
useful to take into account of where risk lies. It
suggests that risk be allocated to the most
economically efficient result. This observation is
theoretically sound, but any given system is likely
to be the subject of negotiation between parties
of various bargaining strengths rather than
designed wholly with economic efficiency in mind.
The commentary acknowledges this fact more
clearly by discussing the need for weaker parties to
be protected by industry codes or legislation in
systems not freely negotiated.
Principle 3 recognizes that security will fall to
the providers of authentication infrastructure and
those who administer the system. The Principle
correctly identifies the dynamic nature of security
measures – both the threats and the development
of technology to counter those threats. The
Principle also refers to the need for balance
between security and the need to respect the
rights of participants in keeping with the principles
of a democratic society.
Principle 4 relating to privacy does not add
much to obligations already in place through
Canadian legislation, whether through the federal
Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act (“PIPEDA”) or similar provincial
legislation. These legislative requirements must be
built into any system. The useful insight here is
that certain authentication systems may not
require the collection of any personal information
(and this is why authentication focuses on
credentials, not identity). For example, transit
passes can function by determining that the
individual has the required money on a stored
value device or valid pass. No information about
the rider need necessarily be collected. The
premise that the least amount of personal
information possible should be collected provides a
useful analytical starting point for designing
systems that comply with privacy legislation.
Principle 5 requires disclosure to participants to
promote awareness of risks and responsibilities.
The principle is similar to rules regarding disclosure
by investment funds to their investors, in that the
goal is to allow for informed participation by end-
users. The principle also aligns with the practice of
placing terms of use on web sites and obligations
found in legislation relating to collection and use
of personal information.11 The end-user should
appreciate not only the features of the system but
also the risk associated with use.
Principle 6 sets out requirements for complaint
handling. Once again the similarity to legislation
relating to privacy legislation is striking.12 The
stated aim to improve end-user confidence in
authentication systems shines through most
strongly here. Given that identity theft is one of
the principal fears affecting e-commerce, the focus
on confidence-building measures around perceived
system problems is not surprising.
Conclusion
The Industry Canada Principles are far from
establishing legislative criteria for authentication
providers. Those who favour government setting
out such criteria for certificate authorities for the
economy generally will be disappointed. This was
not the working group’s goal, however.  The
Principles will not necessarily in and of themselves
break down barriers between government,
business, industry sectors or players within sectors
relating to authentication systems. The clear
intention has been to steer away from such overly
ambitious goals in favour of a general framework
under which players in various sectors can use
common language to parse out their interests. This
in itself is a useful dialogue that could contribute
to maturation of electronic authentication within
the economy. For lawyers formulating agreements
the Principles provide broad guidance about
general roles, responsibilities and risk allocation
associated with authentication systems. n
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10  Principles, p 12.
11  For example Principle 8 – Openness, Annex 1 to PIPEDA.
12  For example Principle 10 – Challenging Compliance, Annex 1, PIPEDA.
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